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Abstract: This article looks at human trafficking from a perspective influenced by the 
‘vulnerability theory’ developed by Martha Fineman and her associates. It draws particu-
larly on empirical studies of human trafficking from Albania to the UK and elsewhere. It 
suggests that Fineman’s approach needs to be modified to see the state not only as ame-
liorating vulnerability, or failing to do so, but as actively creating and using vulnerability 
to control or exploit its population. The fact that people are placed, for political, social and 
economic reasons, in situations of heightened vulnerability does not of itself deprive them 
of agency or responsibility. People should, however, be understood as ‘vulnerable subjects’ 
whose capacity for autonomy may be lost when they are deprived of supportive social 
relationships. The implications of this view for the criminal responsibility of trafficking vic-
tims are explored. 
 
Introduction  
In keeping with the theme of this issue, this article focusses on the trafficking of vulnerable 
adults; invulnerable adults, as well as children, are beyond its scope. But who are these 
invulnerable adults? To be human is to be vulnerable – to disease, cold, hunger, the dis-
ruption of social relationships on which we depend. As Martha Fineman, the most influen-
tial legal scholar of vulnerability puts it, vulnerability is ‘the primary human condition’.1  
 
Clearly this special issue is not intended to be about adults in general, but about adults 
who are vulnerable in particular ways; but this, too, can be said of most if not all victims 
of trafficking. To be trafficked is to be transported (either between countries or within any 
country) with a view to exploitation, whether in the form of sexual exploitation, labour 
exploitation or the removal of organs.2 While people will submit to exploitation for a variety 
of reasons (for example, are academics ‘vulnerable’ to working far longer hours than we 
are paid for?), the exploitation involved in many cases of human trafficking is so egregious 
that people would be unlikely to submit to it unless something in their situation made 
                                                          
1 M. A. Fineman, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth’ (2014) 23 Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Re-
view 307. 
2 Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 2. 
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them particularly vulnerable to coercion, manipulation or deception. It seems a reasonable 
assumption and, as we shall see, one borne out by evidence, that most victims of traffick-
ing are vulnerable, not just in the ‘ontological’ sense that all humans are vulnerable, but 
in the sense that their particular situation makes them more vulnerable than others.3  
 
In the context of human trafficking, there is little sense in distinguishing between vulner-
able adults and adult victims in general. It is, of course, possible to identify people whose 
vulnerability stems in part from their physical or mental characteristics, such as, those 
with learning disabilities (considered in greater detail in Brookbanks’ article in this issue). 
But as Jonathan Herring argues in Vulnerable Adults and the Law, such people are espe-
cially vulnerable only when they lack the social support that they need.4 Theirs, too, is a 
particular type of situational vulnerability. The focus of our inquiries should be on what 
creates situational vulnerability and what can be done to counter it. 
 
By shifting our focus in this way we can avoid attributing vulnerability in an essentialising 
fashion to certain social groups.5 Such attributions can produce a doubly invidious effect. 
Those framed as ‘vulnerable’ can be treated as lacking in agency and in need of paternal-
istic, coercive control, while those not deemed vulnerable can be stigmatised as a threat 
– and therefore in need of coercive control without any benevolent façade. We can see 
this clearly in relation to human trafficking. Trafficking for sexual exploitation is often 
conflated with sex work in general to produce an image of all sex workers as passive 
victims in need of rescue. This obscures the possibility that many sex workers may be 
exercising meaningful choice, albeit often with a limited and unattractive range of options. 
Coercive measures against sex work can then be justified as part of an anti-trafficking 
policy and in the interest of the paternalistic ‘rescue’ of sex workers. Those who cannot be 
portrayed as fitting the passive-victim stereotype may be punished rather than helped.6 
Trafficking, in contrast, is often also (erroneously) equated with people-smuggling and 
used to justify a tightening of border controls.  
 
                                                          
3 On the distinction between ontological and situational vulnerability, see E. Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerabilty: 
A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice (Routledge: London, 2014). 
4 J. Herring, Vulnerable Adults and the Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016) 2. 
5 V. E. Munro and J. Scoular, ‘Abusing Vulnerability? Contemporary Law and Policy Responses to Sex Work in 
the UK’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 189, 196; M. A. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive 
State’, (2010) 60 Emory Law Journal 251, 266; K. Brown, K. Eccleston and N. Emmel, ‘The Many Faces of Vul-
nerability’ (2017) 16(3) Social Policy & Society 497. 
6 A. Carline, ‘Of Frames, Cons and Affects: Constructing and Responding to Prostitution and Trafficking for Sex-
ual Exploitation’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 207, 211, J. Scoular and M. O’Neill ‘Regulating Prostitution: 
Social Inclusion, Responsibilization and the Politics of Prostitution Reform’ (2007) 47 British Journal of Crimi-
nology 764. 
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Border controls, however, are an important source of situational vulnerability. As a recent 
report by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group (ATMG) argues: 
 
a number of measures in the [Immigration Act 2016] increase vulnerability of mi-
grants to exploitation, including: 
 
• Measures making it illegal for those without status to rent accommodation; 
• Measures creating criminal offences for landlords who ‘know or have rea-
sonable cause to believe tenants are disqualified from renting as a result of 
their immigration status;’ 
• New eviction powers to proprietors; 
• A new offence of illegal working.7 
 
Moreover, as ATMG points out, rules tying overseas domestic workers to specific employ-
ers make then vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The rise of homelessness, linked to 
austerity measures, ‘has meant a rise in the number of people who are extremely vulner-
able to trafficking and exploitation’; and a programme of returning trafficked migrants to 
their countries fails to address their vulnerability to re-trafficking.8   
 
The broader point made by the ATMG is that the causes of vulnerability are largely sys-
temic,9 and attributable in particular to the laws, policies and practices of states. We shall 
develop a similar argument in relation to one state which is perceived to be a major source 
of trafficking to the UK and has experienced widespread internal human trafficking, namely 
Albania.  
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we examine Fineman’s approach to 
vulnerability and explain why we are adopting it only with some significant modifications. 
We then turn to our case study of Albania, which can be seen both as a vulnerable state 
and one which produces situations of particular vulnerability to human trafficking. In light 
of this, we then look at the ethical and legal questions concerning the responsibilities of 
citizens, corporations of the state towards victims of trafficking, and the responsibility of 
victims of trafficking for offences they may commit as a result of their victimisation. The 
main point that emerges from the discussion of Albania is that the mere fact that people 
are in a vulnerable situation does not deprive them of agency or responsibility. Organised 
                                                          
7 Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Before the Harm is Done: Examining the UK’s Response to the Prevention 
of Trafficking (ATMG: London, 2018) 43 (footnotes omitted). Available at: http://www.antislavery.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Before-the-Harm-is-Done-report.pdf (accessed 22 October 2018).  
8 Ibid. at 44-5, 47, 54. 
9 Ibid. at 11. 
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crime may provide people with resources with which they attempt to reduce their vulner-
ability, but it may then place them in a situation in which any meaningful agency is lost. 
The different ways in which the law on duress, abuse of process and the defences under 
the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 54 respond to this situation are discussed towards the 
end of the article. 
 
Vulnerability, the Human Condition and Human Trafficking 
Several influential moral and political theories, notably those of Judith Butler,10  Robert 
Goodin, Brian Turner and Alasdair Macintyre,11  stress the importance of vulnerability as 
an aspect of the human condition and a source of moral obligations. In legal studies, 
however, the term ‘vulnerability theory’ is associated particularly with the work of Martha 
Fineman12 and her associates in the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative. 13 
For Fineman, vulnerability as an aspect of the human condition is constant and universal, 
even though different people experience it in different ways. Our bodily condition and 
social relations are always susceptible to changes that affect our well-being. Vulnerability 
theory does not regard people as more or less vulnerable, but rather as experiencing in 
different ways the vulnerability we all share. People do, however, vary in their degree of 
resilience, that is, ‘the means and ability to recover from harms or setbacks’.14 Those 
means and abilities are acquired and developed largely through social institutions, partic-
ularly those of the state. A ‘responsive state’ is ethically obliged to respond to vulnerability 
through the equitable provision of the resources that sustain resilience.15 
 
While we are sympathetic to the aims of vulnerability theory, there are two aspects of it 
that we find problematic in the context of human trafficking. First, states do not only 
provide, or fail to provide, the resources needed sustain the resilience of potential traf-
ficking victims, i.e. their ability to recover when they have been harmed. Rather, they 
often create, either as a matter of deliberate policy (as in the UK’s ‘hostile environment’ 
for illegal migrants) or by ineptitude and corruption, the very vulnerabilities (in the sense 
                                                          
10 J. Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso: London, 2006); J. Bulter, Frames of 
War (Verso: London 2010). See also Gilson, above n. 3, whose work builds on Butler’s but is more systemati-
cally argued; and Carline, above n. 6, for a Butlerian perspective on human trafficking. 
11 R. E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities (University of Chicago 
Press, 1985); B. S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (Pennsylvania State University Press: University 
Park, 2006); A. Macintyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Open Court: Chicago, 1999). 
12 The original formulation of the theory is in M. A. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1. 
13 A group of scholars centred at Emory University in Atlanta (http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/). We 
are greatly indebted to the excellent papers and discussions at a Workshop organised by the Initiative at Leeds 
University in September 2018. 
14 Fineman, above n. 1 at 320. 
15 Fineman, above n. 5 at 251.  ] 
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of increased risks of harm to their basic interests) that traffickers exploit. That the state 
can create vulnerability should not be a controversial point for criminal lawyers. Through 
criminal law, the state renders people vulnerable to punishment if they commit certain 
acts, usually in an attempt to reduce the vulnerability of others to the harm such acts 
would cause. 
 
In writing of the state creating or aggravating vulnerability, we (and ATMG) are using the 
word ‘vulnerability’ in its ordinary sense – that of being exposed to some risk of harm to 
which one lacks an effective defence.  Vulnerability theory does not use the word in its 
ordinary sense but rather as a term of art,16 defined in Fineman’s recent work as ‘the 
continuous susceptibility to change in both our bodily and social well-being that all human 
beings experience’.17 Vulnerability theorists equate vulnerability with ‘ontological’18 or 
‘universal’ vulnerability, and avoid using it in the sense of situational vulnerability; the risk 
of specific harms that a person is exposed to here and now, which is obviously greater for 
some people, at  certain times, than for others. Given this conception of vulnerability, ‘the 
right question’, as Phil Bielby puts it in the context of mental health, ‘is to ask how con-
straints on one’s resilience to cope with universal vulnerability are causing one’s lived 
experience of vulnerability to be more acute or onerous than that of someone else, rather 
than whether one is vulnerable or not, or how vulnerable one is.’19 
 
The laudable aim of this way of framing the question is to promote solidarity and avoid 
invidious distinctions between those who are deemed vulnerable (and in need of paternal-
istic control) and those who are not (and can therefore be treated punitively or held re-
sponsible for their own misfortunes). It is important, particularly in the context of human 
trafficking, to challenge such invidious dichotomies. But redefining the concept of vulner-
ability in this way may also have less salutary consequences. It may obscure the ways in 
which states do not merely fail to respond to vulnerability, but positively use situational 
vulnerability as a tool to control or exploit their populations. And it can leave the vulnera-
bility theorist and the exponent of conventional vulnerability discourse talking past each 
other, because each uses the same word in a different way. It seems to us more illumi-
nating to use the word ‘vulnerability’ in more or less its ordinary sense, while emphasising 
the universal vulnerability that all humans (and other animals) share, and recognising that 
when people do find themselves in particularly vulnerable situations, this can usually be 
                                                          
16 Thanks to Stu Marvel for pointing this out. 
17 M. A. Fineman, ‘Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality’ (2017) 4 Oslo Law Review 133, 142. 
18 Gilson, above n. 3. 
19 P. Bielby, ‘Not “Us” and “Them”: Toward a Normative Legal Theory of Mental Health Vulnerability’ [2018] 
International Journal of Law in Context 1, 4. 
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attributed to inadequate social provision rather than some irremediable deficiency on their 
part. Jonathan Herring’s work on vulnerable adults makes both those points very effec-
tively while also using the word ‘vulnerability’ in a fairly conventional sense, which he 
defines as follows: 
 
P is vulnerable if the following three factors are present:  
 
1. P faces a risk of harm. 
2. P does not have the resources to be able to avoid the risk of harm materi-
alizing. 
3. P would not be able to adequately respond to the harm if the risk material-
ized.20 
 
The second reservation which we have about vulnerability theory concerns its emphasis 
on the role of the state in promoting resilience. Judith Butler and her colleagues have 
expressed concern that Fineman’s analysis encourages feminists to rely on paternalistic 
state institutions.21 A more specific concern in the context of transnational human traf-
ficking is that the theory fails to explain clearly to whom, and why, the state owes an 
obligation to promote resilience. Fineman avoids entering into debate about the limits of 
citizenship,22 but we have to consider why the state owes an obligation to migrant victims 
of trafficking.  
 
Leaving aside the legalistic answer that it has accepted such obligations in international 
law,23 the obvious answer is that we all, as vulnerable human beings, owe an obligation 
to help our fellow humans who are experiencing acute vulnerability, but we largely dele-
gate this obligation to the state. The moral basis for this obligation can be found in a 
modified form of Kantianism, which starts by recognising that  to experience oneself as an 
autonomous moral subject is a precarious achievement, which vulnerable humans can 
attain, at best, only for a part of their lives, and only with the support of others.  
 
Subjects who acknowledge their own vulnerability ought to recognise that, since they need 
others to respond to their vulnerability with care rather than exploitation, they should 
                                                          
20 Herring, above n. 4 at 25. 
21 J. Butler, Z. Gambetta and L. Sabsay, ‘Introduction’ in Butler et al (eds), Vulnerability and  Resistance (Duke 
University Press: Durham, NC, 2016) 4, 11. 
22 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject’, above n. 5, 256. 
23 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supple-
menting the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); Council of Europe Con-
vention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005); Directive 2011/36/EU (2011) on preventing and 
combatting trafficking. 
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respond to the vulnerability of others in the same way.24 We shall argue that this concep-
tion of a vulnerable subject helps to understand the legal position of victims of trafficking. 
Others might prefer the more Levinasian approach of Judith Butler, according to which it 
is an ineluctable fact of moral experience ‘that others make moral claims upon us…that 
we are not free to refuse’.25 Either way, the primary obligation is one that each of us owes 
to our fellow humans in need, and any obligation laid on the state is derivative from this 
obligation. The question arises whether we can simply rely on the state to discharge this 
responsibility for us, particularly in the case of human trafficking where many individuals 
and corporations benefit from the exploitation of trafficked persons. 
 
Vulnerability and trafficking: the Albanian case  
 
To illustrate the relationship between vulnerability and human trafficking we draw on the 
literature about human trafficking within and from Albania. First, however, we must enter 
an important caveat: the current reality of human trafficking from Albania, in particular to 
the UK, is difficult to ascertain. Statistics from the National Referral Mechanism indicate 
that Albanians constitute a significant proportion of those referred to the NCA as being 
potential victims of trafficking.26 We cannot, however, find any figures on how many of 
these cases receive a positive reasonable grounds (or conclusive grounds) decision from 
the Competent Authority indicating a probability that they actually are victims of traffick-
ing.27 Still less, of course, do we know how many of these decisions are correct – assuming 
that there is such a thing as an objectively correct decision to be made. There is, however, 
evidence from research studies to suggest that the level of human trafficking from Albania 
has declined substantially in recent years.28 Much of the literature on Albanian organised 
                                                          
24 See D. Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007) 
Ch 1; P. Formosa, ‘The Role of Vulnerability in Kantian Ethics’ in C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers and S. Dodds (eds.) 
Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2014); P Bielby, 
‘Justifying Mental Health Rights from a Gewirthian Perspective’ in P Bauhn (ed) Gewirthian Perspectives on Hu-
man Rights (Taylor & Francis: London, 2016). 
25 J. Butler, Precarious Life (Verso: London, 2004) 131, drawing on E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 
Exteriority (Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, 1969). 
26 NCA Annual Report 2017: Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking: National Referral Mechanism Statistics. 
Available at:  <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/national-referral-mechanism-statistics/2017-
nrm-statistics/884-nrm-annual-report-2017/file> (accessed 17 October 2018). 
27 Ibid. at 5. The ‘standard of proof’ for a ‘reasonable grounds’ decision is obscurely worded, and could be in-
terpreted as close to ‘reasonable suspicion’ or to ‘clear and convincing evidence’. See Home Office, Victims of 
Modern Slavery – Competent Authority Guidance, version 4.0 (2018), 50. Available at: https://assets.publish-
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/744070/victims-of-modern-
slavery-competent-authority-v4.0-EXT.PDF (accessed 22 October 2018).  
28 I. Jusufi, ‘Albania’s Transformation since 1997: Successes and Failures’ (2017) 23(77) Croatian International 
Relations Review 109; J. Arsovska, ‘Decline, Change or Denial: Human Trafficking and EU Responses in the Bal-
kan Triangle’ (2008) 2(1) Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 50; F. Zhilla, and B. Lamallari ‘Albanian Crimi-
nal Groups’, (2015) 18(4) Trends in Organized Crime 329. 
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crime dates from a decade or more ago and should not be taken as portraying the current 
situation. What it reveals about the situation in Albania between 1991 and c. 2008 never-
theless remains an interesting illustration of general issues about vulnerability, organised 
crime and the state. 
 
A Vulnerable State? 
From the perspective of vulnerability theory, institutions as well as states can be consid-
ered vulnerable.29 The notion of institutional vulnerability has not been very precisely de-
fined but we would suggest that it involves the risk to an institution of either losing the 
capacity to achieve its organisational goals, or being deflected from pursing them, for 
example, by corruption.  
 
What is particularly significant in a state such as Albania is its vulnerability to losing ca-
pacity through infiltration by organised crime groups and the corruption of public offi-
cials.30 Such corruption may cause a state to become ‘fragile’ and incapable of delivering 
crucial public goods such as safety, security and other basic services.31 In such a situation, 
criminal enterprises are able, by the use of force, threats, and the corruption of public 
officials, to profit from illicit activities for which there may be great public demand.32 The 
general population loses trust in the state’s capacity to provide for its wellbeing33 and the 
state may appear to working in favour of criminal networks34 rather than protecting its 
citizens. In such fragile states, criminal groups can undertake different activities, such as 
human trafficking, and infiltrate into the legitimate economy through corruption of its 
agents.35  
 
In this sense, state institutions are particularly vulnerable to transnational organised crime 
(TOC). Jan van Dijk argues that one of the most important impacts of TOC on a state is 
the harm it does to the quality of its governance.36 He states that by corrupting and oth-
erwise compromising the integrity of public officials and institutions through corruption 
                                                          
29 Fineman, above n. 5 at 273; S. Marvel, ‘The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to 
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 2047, 2066. 
30 J. van Dijk, ‘Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and Its Impact Upon Societies (2007) 19(4) Trends in 
Organized Crime 39. 
31 P. Miraglia, R. Ochoa and I. Briscoe (2012), Transnational Organised Crime and Fragile States, OECD Develop-
ment Working Paper 3/2012. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institu-
tions/WP3%20Transnational%20organised%20crime.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2018) 4.  
32 J. S. Albanese, Organized Crime in Our Times, 6th ed (Anderson: Cincinnati, 2010) 4. 
33 Miraglia, et al., above n. 31, 14. 
34 F. Varese, (2000), ‘Pervasive Corruption’, in A. Ledeneva and M. Kurkchiyan (eds.), Economic Crime in Russia 
(Kluwer Law International: London, 2000).  
35 J. van Dijk,  above n. 30 
36 Ibid. 
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and threats, organised crime erodes the state’s long-term capacity to provide for the com-
mon good. Where national and local authorities are incapable of delivering crucial public 
goods such as safety, security and other basic services, they face a loss of legitimacy that 
can endanger their ability to remain in power.37 The combination of lack of capacity and 
lack of legitimacy is sometimes referred to as state ‘fragility.’38 TOC can infiltrate the 
structural composition of states, feeding on weaknesses and eventually heightening fra-
gility,39 which might be considered an extreme form of institutional vulnerability. 
 
The problem with this language of ‘fragility’ and ‘vulnerability’ is that it assumes the state 
in question has a goal of delivering public goods but lacks the capacity to do so. Some 
states, however, are more aptly described as kleptocracies,40 or ‘sultanistic regimes’41 
whose organisational goal is to enrich the ruling elite and bestow sufficient patronage to 
maintain the loyalty of subordinate power-holders. A state that appears to its citizens to 
be captured by, or systematically to favour, criminal networks can fall irretrievably into a 
legitimacy crisis42 as the general population loses trust in the state’s capacity or willing-
ness to provide for their wellbeing.43 
 
Particularly in a case such as the Albanian state, however, we should be wary of the idea 
that the state was captured by some powerful, cohesive, mafia-like organisation. It seems 
more likely that the state was undermined through a series of interactions between small, 
fluid, opportunistic criminal organisations and equally opportunistic officials and political 
parties.44 Exploitation of women for prostitution appears often to be a family or clan-based 
business, one that does not require a large investment.45 This is consistent with a general 
pattern discerned by Miraglia and colleagues, in which ‘long-standing hierarchical and pa-
trician organisations operating in a manner similar to legitimate transnational firms’ are 
giving way to ‘interconnected, flexible and opportunistic networks’, particularly in criminal 
                                                          
37 Varese, above n. 34; J. West, ‘The Political Economy of Organized Crime and State Failure: The Nexus of 
Greed, Need and Grievance’ (2006) 6 Innovations: A Journal of Politics, 6. 
38 Miraglia et al., above n. 31 at 5.  
39 Ibid. at 4.  
40 S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 113.  
41 H. E. Chehabi and J. J. Linz (eds.), Sultanistic Regimes (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1998). 
42 Varese, above n. 34. 
43 Miraglia et al., above n. 31 at 14. 
44 F. Zhila and B. Lamallari, Evolution of the Albanian Organised Crime Groups (Open Society Foundation: Ti-
rana, 2016); I. Gjoni, ‘Organized crime and national security: The Albanian case’, MA Diss., US Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36695412.pdf (accessed 17 October 2018); R. 
Vogler, ‘Organised Crime, People Trafficking and Corruption: The Albanian Question’, paper presented at the 
Round Table ‘Tackling Corruption Relating to Human Trafficking’, 19 April 2017, RUSI, London. For the ‘mafia’ 
image see X. Raufer, ‘A Neglected Dimension of Conflict: The Albanian Mafia’ in J. Kohler and C. Zürcher (eds.), 
Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia (Man-
chester University Press, 2003). 
45 Arsovska, above n. 28, 50, 52. 
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markets concerned with logistics rather than production.46 Their operation ‘depends cru-
cially on the co-operation of local officials and security forces, and on the consent or in-
difference of the public’. In the case of Albania, there is evidence that security forces, and 
former security service members who retain close ties to the state, have been active in 
human trafficking.47 Moreover, ordinary people may have co-operated with traffickers be-
cause it was, for them, a form of resilience: a way of coping with dire economic circum-
stances when other institutions failed. Court case analysis by Tota and Mecka showed that 
traffickers had family relations with the victim and relatives had supported the trafficking 
for economic necessity.48  
 
Albanian organised crime groups started to develop rapidly after the fall of communism in 
the early 1990s. Illegal migration of Albanians to Western European countries was virtually 
uncontrolled owing to lack of police manpower, expertise and funds. In this environment, 
it was relatively easy formal and informal networks to establish themselves in the business 
of human trafficking.49 Ethnic Albanian criminals began to gain a reputation in criminal 
and law enforcement circles as pimps and traffickers in women for sexual exploitation.50 
They took over prostitution markets in London, Amsterdam, Paris, Athens, Frankfurt, and 
other cities.51 The money from prostitution was invested in Albania or re-invested in the 
criminal business itself.52    
 
In 1997, Albania experienced a collapse of order and widespread violence, which resulted 
in a situation where the government was overthrown and some 2,000 people were killed. 
The 1997 disorder came as a result of the collapse of fraudulent financial pyramid 
schemes. Albania’s transitional period from communism to democracy, which began in 
1990, led to the establishment of new structures for profiting from the country’s re-
sources.53 As the pyramid schemes collapsed and many people lost their life savings, an 
opposition political party opened the prisons and released the inmates. All manner of guns 
                                                          
46 Miraglia, et al., above n. 31 at 7-8.  
47 G. Xhudo, ‘Men of Purpose: the Growth of the Albanian Criminal Activity’ (1996) 2(1) Transnational Orga-
nized Crime 1; Center for Study of Democracy, Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between Organized 
Crime and the Security Sector in Southeast Europe (author: Sofia, 2004) 91; J. Leman, and S. Janssens ‘Albanian 
Entrepreneurial Practices in Human Smuggling and Trafficking: On the Road to the United Kingdom via Brus-
sels, 1995–2005’ (2012) 50(6) International Migration 166, 167; Zhilla and Lamallari, above n. 44 at 27. 
48 N. Tota and N. Mecka, ‘Some Phenomenological Characteristics of The Human Trafficking in Albania during 
the Period from 2003 to 2014’ [2015] European Scientific Journal (special ed.) 303.  
49 M. H. Meçe, ‘Effectiveness of Counter-Trafficking Response in Albania’ (2016) 14 Social Change Review 25, 
29. 
50 J. Arsovska, above n. 28 at 52. 
51 J. Bennetto, ‘Albanians Taking over London Vice’ The Independent (25 November 2002); see, also, J. Ben-
netto, ‘New Vice Squad to Tackle Airport Sex-Slave Auctions’ The Independent (5 June 2006). 
52 Arsovska, above n. 28. 
53 Jusufi, above n. 28 at 81.  
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and munitions were abandoned and could be taken freely.54 The resulting situation is viv-
idly described by Jusufi: 
 
Almost every family was armed. Tanks replaced normal traffic on the streets. The 
whole of the Albanian population had access to arms. The feeling that as far as the 
state went they were on their own, led the majority of citizens to shut themselves 
up at home in terror. The availability of arms led to emergence of potentially crim-
inal thugs firing guns…. Violence escalated at the individual level as well. There was 
an unexpected revival of blood feuds, or revenge killings. An increasing number of 
people, as a result, were indirectly involved in blood feuds. The prisons opened, 
releasing criminals and political prisoners. Thousands of Albanians fled or at-
tempted to flee on boats to Italy.55 
 
In the period following the near financial collapse of 1997 and the conflict in Kosovo (1998–
1999), Albanian organised crime groups expanded their operations to Western Europe and 
the United States. Media coverage of their activities reached a peak. Albanian criminals 
were considered to be a ‘dangerous breed’, posing a threat to society.56 
 
A World Bank study of the transition period in Albania used the concept of vulnerability to 
describe ‘the new conditions of social weakness suddenly created by the turmoil in society, 
which are qualitatively different from poverty’, although they often overlap with it in prac-
tice.57 The researchers argued that social exclusion and gender abuse were also major 
contributors to vulnerability. They wrote that vulnerable groups of these kinds were seen 
mostly in the cities and rural communities of the middle and coastal regions, where un-
controlled migration flows accelerated the breakdown of the traditional family structure in 
a context in which no mechanisms were in place to provide support and protection and 
women considered their circumstances intolerable. 58  John Davies, in a controversial 
study,59 added that an increasing number of women were deliberately resorting to illegal 
migration and sex work to escape intolerable social traditions.60  
                                                          
54 J. Arsovska ‘The “G-local” Dimension of Albanian Organized Crime: Mafias, Strategic Migration and State Re-
pression’ (2014) 20(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 205, 214.  
55 Jusufi, above n. 28 at 89. 
56 Arsovska, above n. 54 at 205.  
57 G. La Cava and R. Y. Nanetti, Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap (World Bank Technical Paper no. 460, 
2000). Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/587091468742830114/pdf/multi-
page.pdf> (accessed 18 October 2018) 1.  
58 Ibid. at 2.  
59 J. Bindel, ‘The shocking tale of John Davies, pro-prostitution academic & trafficking denier, recently jailed for 
fraud’. Available at: https://www.feministcurrent.com/2016/06/10/john-davies-pro-prostitution-aca-
demic-trafficking-denier-jailed/ (accessed 26 September 2018). 
60 J. Davies, My Name Is Not Natasha (Amsterdam University Press, 2009) 115.   
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 Albania remains a country of origin of women trafficked mainly for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation; however, since 2005 there has been a decline in the number of persons being 
trafficked.61 From 2005 onwards, Belgian police increased their interventions on Belgian 
motorways, resulting in a decrease of Albanians operations on the human trafficking route 
between Brussels and England (which involved the smuggling or trafficking of people of 
many nationalities besides Albanians).62 The problem of human trafficking has not been 
resolved but rather, as Limanowska explains, the traffickers became more professional 
and changed their modus operandi in response to counter trafficking measures.63  
 
Kevin Bales has argued that corruption is a driving factor of human trafficking.64 Cho et 
al65 and van Dijk and Klerx-van Mierlo66 have shown correlations between perceived levels 
of corruption, actual victimisation by corruption, and poor performance on measures of 
anti-trafficking effectiveness. Distrust in the judicial system and in police corruption also 
increased the risk of sex trafficking in Albania. Albanian police have facilitated sex traf-
ficking by collaborating with smugglers while victims have found their case dropped or 
delayed for years. Ongoing relationships between politicians, public servants, and crimi-
nals have strengthened the positions of criminal organizations at the borders, and police 
have regularly helped falsify documents.67  
 
Leman and Janssens write that following the collapse of communism in 1991, some of the 
former Albanian security service or Sigurimi agents who lost their jobs when the agency 
was restructured (although former colleagues remained employed by the new security 
service) offered their services to criminal organisations.68 Having joined criminal organi-
sations which were active in human smuggling and trafficking, they brought typical intel-
ligence techniques into the criminal network for internal secret communication.69 They 
                                                          
61 Jusufi, above n. 28 at 109.  
62 J. Leman and S. Janssens, above n. 47 at 167. 
63 B. Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe (UNDP: Sarajevo, 2005). 
64 K. Bales ‘What Predicts Human Trafficking?’ (2007) 31(2) International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminal Justice 269. 
65 S.-Y. Cho, A. Dreyer and E. von Neumayer, The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Polices: Evidence from a New Index 
(CEGE Discussion Papers, no. 119, University of Göttingen, 2011) 
66 J. van Dijk and F. Klerx-van Mierlo, ‘Indicators of Corruption: Further Explorations of the Link Between Cor-
ruption and Implementation Failure in Anti-Trafficking Policies’ (2011), available at https://www.uni-heidel-
berg.de/fakultaeten/wiso/awi/humantrafficking/papers.html (accessed 31 Oct 2018). 
67 V. Bekteshi, E. Gjermeni and M. Van Hook ‘Modern Day Slavery: Sex Trafficking in Albania’ (2012) 32 Inter-
national Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 480, 484. 
68 Leman and Janssens, above n. 47 at 167. See also Xhudo, above n. 47. 
69 Center for the Study of Democracy, Partners in Crime. The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector 
and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe (Author: Sofia, 2004). See also J. Leman and S. Janssens ‘An Analysis 
of Some Highly-Structured Networks of Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Bel-
gium’ (2006) 22(3) Migracijskei Etnicketeme 231, 232. 
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collaborated closely with corrupted border and visa control officials.70 These former intel-
ligence service members could also activate their contacts within Western embassies to 
obtain visas, and they facilitated the access to hotels or other places of stay for the tem-
porary housing of people in transit.71   
 
In short, the Albanian state by a combination of corruption, economic mismanagement 
and a failure to respond to the needs of women, the Roma and other socially vulnerable 
groups, has done much to create and perpetuate conditions in which Albanians are vul-
nerable to human trafficking. How far this should be interpreted as a case of state vulner-
ability, as opposed to state institutions deliberately pursuing criminal objectives, is a dif-
ficult question. 
 
Victims of Trafficking as Vulnerable Subjects 
Little work has been done to apply vulnerability theory to crime,72 and, in particular, to 
organised crime. We would suggest, however, that just as writers such as Diego Gambetta 
conceptualise organised crime as creating alternative sources of trust and protection 
where the state is weak,73 organised crime can be understood as an alternative source of 
resilience, both for active participants and for those who use their services; but one which 
at the same time tends to create acute situational vulnerabilities. For example, in remote 
rural areas of Albania, and in marginalised urban areas, human trafficking has become a 
source of resilience for families and clans who exploit young women as sex workers.74 
Court case analysis by Tota and Mecka showed that traffickers in Albania often had family 
relations with the victim and relatives had supported trafficking out of economic neces-
sity.75 Leman and Janssens state that, in Albania, the entrepreneurial techniques for hu-
man trafficking networks remain clan-related with the potential use of violence and abso-
lute control.76 A perverted understanding of the Kanun (a mediaeval codification of Alba-
                                                          
70 Center for the Study of Democracy, The Drug Market in Bulgaria (Author: Sofia, 2003). 
71 M. Hajdinjak, Smuggling in Southeast Europe. The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal 
Networks in the Balkans  (Center for the Study of Democracy: Sofia, 2002) 
72  But see S. Marvel, ‘The Vulnerable Subject of Rape Law: Rethinking Autonomy and Consent’ (2016) 65 
Emory LJ Online 2035. 
73 D. Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1993). 
74 Miraglia, et al., above n. 31 at 10; Arsovska, above, n. 28 at 52. 
75 Tota and Mecka, above n. 48. 
76 Leman, and Janssens, above, n. 47 at 169. 
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nian customary law) has been used by Albanian traffickers to justify a complete devalua-
tion of the position of women.77 Women become economic assets; a source of resilience 
for the family or clan, but certainly not for themselves. 
 
Other women, as well as men, turn to smugglers or traffickers in an attempt to achieve 
resilience by migrating. As discussed above, many Albanians and especially women have 
experienced acute vulnerability since the fall of communism, for reasons that include but 
are not reducible to severe poverty. Violation of women’s labour and social rights and a 
wide gender wage gap also increased women’s vulnerability.78 Roma women and rural 
women have been considered especially vulnerable to trafficking.79  
 
When people facing acute situational vulnerability seek out the services of people smug-
glers, they are displaying a degree of resilience, ‘bouncing back’ from economic disaster 
and gender-based abuse. At the same time, they make themselves vulnerable to ‘smug-
glers who turn out to be traffickers’.80 In the words of the Upper Tribunal’s Country Guid-
ance: 
 
Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where 
they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there 
is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: 
such women are victims of trafficking.81 
 
Acknowledging the initial resilience of many of those who become victims of  trafficking 
runs counter to the dominant, gendered narrative of traffickers kidnapping, deceiving, 
exploiting, and sometimes enslaving naïve women.82 It must be acknowledged, however, 
that for some Albanian women the dominant narrative is close to the truth. In one-third 
of the Belgian judicial files examined in Leman and Janssens’ study of human smuggling 
and trafficking from Albania, via Belgium, to the UK, ‘lover boy’  techniques, where the 
victim is manipulated into seeing the perpetrator as her boyfriend, were used to lure young 
                                                          
77 J. Arsovska, ‘Understanding a “Culture of Violence and Crime”: the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini and the Rise of 
the Albanian Sexual-slavery Rackets’, (2006) 14 Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice in Europe 161; J. Ar-
sovska, ‘Gender-based Subordination and Trafficking of Women in Ethnic Based Context. The Upward Revalua-
tion of the Kanun Morality’, (2006) 6 Kolor, Journal on Moving Communities 3.  
78 Meçe, above n. 49 at 42. 
79 V. Lesko ‘Assistance and Reintegration Work with Women and Girls from Minority Communities’ CAAHT 
2005 Annual Conference, Sheraton Hotel, Tirana, Albania, Institute for Gender Applied Policies. 
80 J. Berman, ‘Biopolitical Management, Economic Calculation and Trafficked Women’ (2010) 48(4) Interna-
tional Migration 84, 86. 
81 TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC), [119(c)]. 
82 J. Campbell, ‘Shaping the Victim: Borders, security, and human trafficking in Albania’ (2013) 2 Anti-Traffick-
ing Review 81, 85. 
    Page 15 
women into prostitution. (As the files covered varying numbers of migrants, with some 
running into thousands, it is unclear what proportion of individual women were recruited 
in this way.) In Leman and Janssens’ view, under such circumstances, ‘there is not much 
room left for a woman’s personal agency.’83 
 
Nevertheless, migrants who deliberately turn to those they take to be smugglers in order 
to reach the UK or another relatively wealthy country, in some cases with the intention of 
earning money by sex work, may be supposed to exercise a degree of rational agency at 
this initial stage, at least up to the point when the traffickers reveal their true colours.84 
This is consistent with the idea of a ‘vulnerable subject’, capable of exercising autonomy 
and agency but dependent for those capacities on the support of others, and so always 
vulnerable to betrayal. From the point of view of vulnerability theory we are all (at best) 
vulnerable subjects, but in our view some subjects, for social and economic reasons, are 
more vulnerable than others. The implications of such vulnerability for criminal responsi-
bility will be discussed below. 
 
Responsibility and Vulnerability 
In this part of the article, we turn to discussion of the ethical and legal issues surrounding 
the responsibilities of the state and others towards victims of trafficking, and the respon-
sibility of the victims for any offences they may commit at the instigation of their traffickers 
or exploiters. It may be helpful at this stage to summarise the relevant principles that 
emerge from the discussion so far. 
 
(1) Vulnerability is a universal feature of the human condition and gives rise to an 
ethical responsibility to help others overcome their vulnerability, or at least a neg-
ative duty not to exploit the vulnerability of others. That responsibility can be jus-
tified along Kantian lines (as we prefer) or on the even more demanding lines of 
Levinasian ethics. 
 
(2) The responsibilities of the state towards victims of trafficking are not duties towards 
its citizens, but rather duties owed by its citizens to humanity at large, which for 
practical reasons must be largely, but not entirely,  delegated to the state. 
 
                                                          
83 Leman and Janssens, above n. 47at 173. 
84 Berman, above n. 80; A. Gallagher, ‘Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights: Tricks and Treaties’, (2002) 12 
Forced Migration Review 25.  
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(3) In addition to universal human vulnerability it is important (pace Fineman) to take 
account of situational vulnerability, i.e. the features of a person’s situation that 
expose them to heightened risks of particular kinds of harm. 
 
(4) Individual characteristics such as disabilities may mean that a situation is one of 
heightened vulnerability for a person with those characteristics but would not be 
so (to the same degree) for others. Rather than regarding certain groups of people 
as vulnerable per se, we should consider the situations in which they would expe-
rience heightened vulnerability.85 
 
(5) To alleviate their vulnerability people need resources for resilience (the capacity to 
recover from harms or setbacks) but they also need protection against situational 
vulnerability, i.e. against being exposed to heightened risks of harm. (The ability 
to escape from an existing situation of vulnerability can be considered as a form of 
resilience.) 
 
(6) People are responsible, i.e. answerable to public criticism, for wrongful acts com-
mitted when they had the capacity to recognise and respond to the reasons for 
acting otherwise than they did.86 As vulnerable subjects, most of us have those 
capacities some of the time, but not throughout our lives. 
 
In light of those principles, let us consider firstly the responsibility of the state, citizens 
and corporations towards victims of trafficking, and then the extent to which victims can 
justly be held responsible. 
 
Responsibilisation and Preventive Strategies 
According to Garland’s notion of ‘responsibilisation’,87 the burden of crime control is shared 
among participants ‘making individuals, private sector and community responsible for pub-
lic tasks’88 and relieving the state of exclusive responsibility for crime control initiatives. 
Responsibilisation is seen as a neoliberal strategy whereby citizens and potential victims 
will be assigned to take up more responsibility for risk management.89 Since vulnerability 
                                                          
85 See Herring, above n. 4. 
86 See J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge University Press, 1998). We have 
greatly simplified their view, but the nuances need not concern us here.  
87 D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford University Press, 2001) 126-7. 
88 W. Schinkel and F. van Houdt, ‘The Double Helix of Cultural Assimilationism and Neo-liberalism: Citizenship 
in Contemporary Governmentality’ (2010) 61(4) British Journal of Sociology 696, 699. 
89 A. Heber, ‘The Hunt for an Elusive Crime – An Analysis of Swedish Measures to Combat Sex Trafficking’ 
(2018) 19 (1) Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 3, 8.   
    Page 17 
theory is conceived largely as an antidote to neoliberalism,90 we might expect it to reject 
any kind of responsibilisation; but we would suggest that a more nuanced view is called 
for. What critics of responsibilisation usually object to is that it shifts responsibility onto 
vulnerable people themselves to provide their own means of resilience, for example by 
insurance. By stressing human interdependence in the face of universal vulnerability, the 
theory aims to provide a normative basis for a welfare state and welfare-oriented laws. 
But this recognition of human interdependence can also support notions of responsible or 
active citizenship and social inclusion which are not far removed from the thinking associ-
ated with responsibilisation.91  The second in our own list of six principles also points in 
this direction.  
 
We can take an example from an article by Anita Heber which gives a critical account of 
the trend towards responsibilisation in Swedish anti-trafficking policy. She quotes the fol-
lowing statement from the Swedish government crime prevention agency, Brå: 
 
Human trafficking is dependent on these legal actors, who are often unaware that 
they play roles that are important for organised crime. They include ferry compa-
nies, bus companies, travel agencies, restaurants, estate agents, housing agencies 
and landlords. By giving these groups knowledge about how they become involved 
in procuring and human trafficking, and how they are utilised without being aware 
of it, they may become more cautious and observant. This will prevent crime.92   
 
The problem with this statement, we would argue, is not with the idea that citizens and 
businesses could become more knowledgeable and observant, but that (according to 
Heber) the ‘knowledge’ on offer is seriously distorted, conflating sex trafficking (a rela-
tively rare phenomenon in Sweden) with sex work in general, while paying little attention 
to trafficking for labour exploitation.  
 
Situating modern slavery in the context of responsibilisation would favour strategies that 
‘decentre’ criminal law enforcement in favour of a multi-agency regulatory approach.93 
There are undoubtedly good reasons to be suspicious of attempts to market this kind of 
                                                          
90 Fineman, above n. 15 at 134 
91 Schinkel and van Houdt, above n. 88; D. Gilling, Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics (UCL Press: 
London, 1997); G. Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity (Open 
University Press: Buckingham, 1998). 
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multi-agency social control as ‘progressive governance’.94 The danger of this neo-liberal 
approach would be that it offers social inclusion to those who responsibly deal with social 
problems on the one hand and continued exclusion to those who seek or remain involved 
with human traffickers (or more generally, who choose to continue as sex workers) on the 
other. The outcome for those who do not responsibly ‘exit’ sex work involves further crim-
inalisation and marginalisation.95 Moreover the plight of victims of trafficking, coupled with 
conflation of trafficking with migration and sex work,96 provide a convenient rationale for 
increasingly coercive control of both migration and sex work in general.  
 
In contrast, an approach which stressed the responsibility of corporations and consumers 
to avoid benefitting, knowingly or unwittingly, from trafficking for labour exploitation, ei-
ther internationally or within the UK, could be genuinely progressive. In this respect the 
duty of firms with a turnover over £36 million per annum to publish a slavery and human 
trafficking statement to ensure that modern slavery is not involved in their supply chains97 
is a small but welcome step in the right direction. Another is the ‘safe car wash app’ which 
enables car wash customers to complete a short survey on working conditions.98 
 
Criminal Responsibility and Defences 
We turn now to the question of how far people classed as victims of human trafficking can 
be held responsible for any offences they commit. Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 
45, an adult who acted under compulsion attributable to slavery or to exploitation conse-
quent on being a victim of trafficking will have a defence to some charges (subject to long 
and somewhat arbitrary list of exclusions),99 ‘if a reasonable person in the same situation 
as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic 
alternative to doing that act’.100 In the case of a defendant under 18, the word ‘compulsion’ 
is not used and the test is one of whether a reasonable person in the same situation and 
with the same relevant characteristics would do the act.101 Compared to the defence of 
duress, the new defence is somewhat more flexible in taking account of situational vul-
nerability. However, the person in that situation is still expected to act as a ‘reasonable 
person’, or in other words an autonomous moral subject. The law will not recognise the 
                                                          
94 J. Scoular and M. O’Neill ‘Regulating Prostitution’ (2007) 47(5) Br J Criminol 764. 
95 Ibid. at 765. 
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fragility of human autonomy unless it is manifested in a medically diagnosable condition 
that will constitute a ‘relevant characteristic’ of the defendant.102  As Karl Laird argues, it 
seemingly ‘requires a victim of slavery or relevant exploitation to be evaluated against a 
standard they could not possibly have been expected to achieve’.103 A more appropriate 
test, in line with our focus in principle (6) above on the defendant’s ability to recognise 
and respond to reasons for acting otherwise, might be whether the defendant was unable, 
as a result of slavery of exploitation, to see any reasonable alternative to acting as they 
did. A vulnerability-focused approach would concur with Laird’s call ‘to construct a more 
humanising defence’,104 and give the vague word ‘humanising’ a particular meaning: that 
the defence should reflect an understanding of human beings as vulnerable subjects, ra-
ther than the abstract individuals of traditional criminal law doctrine.  
 
 As we hope the preceding discussion has made clear, this is not to endorse the stereotype 
of trafficked persons as passive victims entirely lacking in agency. In relation to Albania, 
we suggested that when people in a highly vulnerable situation turn to smugglers for help 
with migration, possibly with the intention of engaging in sex work, this may at least 
initially constitute a form of resilience, a way of seeking control over one’s life and escaping 
from extreme poverty, gender-based violence and other hardships. When the smugglers 
turn out to be traffickers, however, the migrant may be faced with such levels of coercion 
and manipulation that they lose any meaningful degree of autonomy. Such cases raise a 
thorny question in the theory and doctrine of criminal law: the extent to which people can 
be held responsible for bringing about their own lack of responsibility.105  
 
The law gives different answers to these questions depending on whether a defendant can 
benefit from the specific defence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 45, or whether 
they have to rely on the common law of duress or abuse of process. The latter will apply 
if either the offence is one of those listed in Schedule 4 of the Act, to which the statutory 
offence does not apply (e.g. manslaughter,106 burglary or assisting illegal immigration), 
or it was committed before s. 45 came into force. The law is not concerned with whether 
a person in a positon of such extreme vulnerability is somehow to blame for being in that 
situation.   
 
                                                          
102 Ibid. s. 45(5). 
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It is otherwise where the defendant relies on the common law, as can be seen in the recent 
case of R v GS.107 The appellant was a drugs ‘mule’ arrested and convicted in 2007. In 
2015 she was granted asylum on the basis that she was a victim of trafficking and that 
her life would be in danger if she was sent back to Jamaica. The Competent Authority 
accepted that, on the balance of probabilities, she was a victim of trafficking for the pur-
poses of forced criminality. However, her status as a refugee and her leave to remain in 
the UK would be at risk unless her conviction was overturned.108 She relied on reports 
from two psychologists to the effect that she had suffered cognitive impairment as a result 
of head injuries and her  
 
 ‘vulnerable personality’, coupled with her lowered intellect, accounted ‘for her lack 
of judgment and acquiescence in being manipulated into committing the offence’. 
The Applicant was of ‘borderline intelligence’ and ‘overly compliant’. She had been 
traumatised by her experiences; her lowered intellect and ‘current emotional state’ 
made her ‘vulnerable to exploitation by her more able peers’.109 
 
Her appeal was on the basis that the law had developed since 2007 to the point where it 
would be considered an abuse of process to prosecute a victim of trafficking in her situa-
tion, and given the risk to her immigration status there would be ‘substantial injustice’ if 
the decision were allowed to stand.  
 
The Court of Appeal considered the case under the law of abuse of process as it had 
developed since 2008, not under s. 45 of the 2015 Act.110 It concluded that the psycho-
logical evidence would be largely inadmissible at trial,111 and that the applicant was not 
under such a level of compulsion that it was not in the public interest for her to be prose-
cuted. In reaching the latter decision, the Court attached great weight to the fact that,  
 
cognisant of the risk, she returned to the UK and resumed contact with those whom 
she knew were involved in the drugs trade. That there were or may have been 
health issues prompting her return to the UK does not bear on the resumption of 
contact with those who had, on her own account, already trafficked her to the 
Bahamas.112 
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Applying the principles outlined above, both aspects of the Court of Appeal decision are 
questionable. In relation to admissibility, the Court seems to have asked itself the wrong 
question, namely whether or not the expert evidence would have been admissible in rela-
tion to the defence of duress that GS raised at trial. It is unclear whether the Court an-
swered this question correctly, as the evidence was arguably inadmissible in so far as it 
suggested a link between GS’s psychological compliance and her brain injury.113 The real 
issue is how far the prosecution would have been obliged to consider the psychologists’ 
reports in exercising its discretion whether to prosecute in circumstances where the victim 
had been compelled to participate in crime even if the defence of duress was unavaila-
ble.114 The medical evidence was relevant to the question whether the crime had in fact 
been committed under compulsion not amounting to duress, so that it ought not to be 
prosecuted in light of the Council of Europe Convention Against Trafficking in Human Be-
ings, Art. 26. To answer that question requires an understanding of the interaction be-
tween the individual’s characteristics (including brain injury) and her situational vulnera-
bility, and a psychological report may help to illuminate that difficult issue. 
 
The ruling on abuse of process adopts a ‘reasonable person’ approach that ignores the 
fragility of human autonomy and prioritises punishment over compassion for human vul-
nerability. It is understandable that the House of Lords in Hasan115 should wish to deny a 
defence of duress to someone who had apparently chosen a career within the illegal econ-
omy where it was predictable that his employers would use harsh measures to enforce 
their orders. As Baroness Hale said in that case, however, 
 
It is one thing to deny the defence to people who choose to become members of 
illegal organisations, join criminal gangs, or engage with others in drug-related 
criminality. It is another thing to deny it to someone who has a quite different 
reason for becoming associated with the duressor and then finds it difficult to es-
cape.116 
 
In GS, the applicant’s motives for renewing contact with her traffickers are unclear, but 
there is no indication it was with intention of becoming involved in criminality. If she 
merely showed poor judgement, she had already paid a heavy price without being crimi-
nally punished. Typically victims of trafficking will fall into the second category described 
by Baroness Hale, and it is therefore right that they are not denied a defence under the 
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Modern Slavery Act on the grounds of voluntary association with a person from whom 
some form of compulsion was foreseeable. 
 
Conclusion 
We have used the example of human trafficking to explore the possible value of a form of 
vulnerability theory to criminal law. We have taken Martha Fineman’s influential theory as 
a starting point but have modified it in two respects. First, in common with Jonathan 
Herring,117 we take account of situational vulnerability as well as universal vulnerability. 
In this way we can avoid pathologising ‘vulnerable adults’ as a category of defective beings 
without embracing the strikingly counter-intuitive claim that all human beings are equally 
vulnerable all of the time, even if that vulnerability manifests itself in different ways. An 
exponent of vulnerability theory orthodoxy might respond that it is precisely this counter-
intuitive view that gives the theory its heuristic power,118 but we are not convinced. Sec-
ondly, we adhere to a modified version of the Kantian idea of moral autonomy (though 
perhaps not very much modified, given careful attention to the nuances of Kant’s texts),119 
in which moral autonomy is regarded as a fragile condition which human beings can attain 
only intermittently and with the support of others. 
 Vulnerability theory offers both a social analysis of law and an ethical framework. 
Ethical conclusions cannot be straightforwardly read off from the social analysis, but it is 
important to stress that the theory does not imply that because people are vulnerable they 
are passive or lacking in agency. Much of the time people display resilience in ‘bouncing 
back’ from adversity. Sometimes they do so by criminal means, or with help from organ-
ised crime. People rely on relations with others to maintain their resilience but those rela-
tions are not necessarily benign or motivated by human solidarity. Relations of a less 
benign kind can quickly turn from sources of resilience to sources of acute situational 
vulnerability, as the example of human trafficking illustrates all too clearly. The law should 
take account, to a greater extent than it currently does, of the position of those who are 
not ideal passive victims but who at the time of their alleged offence lack the supportive 
social relations that make autonomy possible. Reforms to the criminal law, however, are 
not going to solve the problem of trafficking. For that we have to look to wider changes in 
the labour market, in which corporations and consumers as well as the state have a part 
to play. 
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